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This paper examines the returns to the socioeconomic background of origin (or “class”) in the 
labor market in Chile. We employ individual data from several cohorts of graduates from the 
same program (Business and Economics) of a large and diverse public University in Chile. The 
data includes productivity measures uncommon in earnings differential studies, such as 
academic performance at University, school academic quality, and second language proficiency.  
Four measures of socioeconomic background are employed, which are significantly correlated. 
These are highly significant in explaining earnings despite their collinearity, and after 
controlling for various measures of productivity. 
 
The class wage gaps obtained by a Oxaca-Ramson decomposition amount to approximately 25 
to 35 percent, which are remarkably higher than wage gaps reported in the literature for other 
workers’ characteristics such as gender, race and physical appearance. Moreover, the effect of 
class is more important in determining earnings than academic performance at University. 
 
Future research must focus on explaining the causes of this large return to class. These may 
emerge from some combination of pure employer discrimination, productivity-enhancing 
discrimination from other parties (such as consumers, peers and suppliers), statistical 
discrimination by employers and  “pure” class-related productivity.  
                                                                 
1 We are grateful to Dante Contreras, José Miguel Benavente, Pilar Romaguera, Osvaldo Larrañaga, 
Joseph Ramos and Rodrigo Montero for their valuable comments and suggestions.  We also thank Teresa 
Vargas, Fernando Hoces and Graciela Pérez, who provided parts of the data.  
I.  Introduction 
 
Discrimination in the labor market has received a great deal of attention from economists. The 
vast theoretical and empirical research done in this area has studied different forms of 
discrimination based o n several workers’ characteristics such as race, gender, ethnicity and 
physical appearance. Yet, discrimination may emerge also from other workers’ characteristics 
than those commonly addressed in the literature. The purpose of this work is to study the effect 
on earnings of another common but neglected phenomenon: “classism” or class-consciousness. 
 
Studying the effect of class on earnings is interesting for both efficiency and normative reasons. 
Labor market efficiency requires labor to be rewarded according to marginal productivity, that 
the division of labor exploits individual talents, and that efficient investment in human capital is 
driven by expected increases in productivity. These conditions are violated if class 
discrimination exists, as earnings would not be driven by expected productivity only. From a 
normative perspective, class discrimination contradicts the largely shared principles of equal 
opportunities and meritocracy, inhibits social mobility and perpetuates economic inequality. It 
also reduces the incentives of the poor to invest in human capital, being even harder for them to 
improve their economic condition. 
 
Class can affect earnings for various reasons. First, class can be associated with some 
productivity–enhancing skills or characteristics. Some examples include the quality of education 
and networking skills. Second, employers can be “classists” or class-conscious in the sense of 
having pure preferences for hiring employees from a certain class. In this case they would be 
willing to s acrifice some productivity in order to hire someone from a preferred class. Third, 
even if employers do not class-discriminate, class-discrimination from other sources can still 
exist (for example from peers, consumers or suppliers). These forms of non-employer 
discrimination may affect an employee's productivity, which profit-maximizing employers 
should be concerned with. Finally, employer statistical class-discrimination would exist if 
employers hire an employee just because they expect his or her class to be associated with 
certain skills or productivity-enhancing characteristics. Since the effect of class on earnings may 
be caused in principle by discrimination and/or productivity effects, in what follows we shall 
refer to it simply as the returns to class.  
 
Most works on discrimination have failed to fully disentangle discrimination and productivity 
effects in the determination of earnings because they often employ few measures of productivity, and therefore many aspects of productivity remain unobserved by the researcher. 
2 
This paper employs a richer and more detailed dataset than most of the related studies on 
earnings differentials, which are based typically on population surveys. Our dataset contains 
various measures of ability and productivity uncommon in the literature, such as performance at 
university, school academic quality and second-language proficiency. This allows us to interpret 
the class effect on earnings either as caused by some form of discrimination, or caused by some 
unobserved source of productivity unrelated to academic merit. As long as academic 
performance is an appropriate measure of merit, this interpretation sheds light on the degree of 
meritocracy of the labor market.   
 
We investigate empirically the returns to class employing a dataset of different cohorts of 
Economics and Business graduates from one large public university in Chile, regarded as one of 
the best of the country and of Latin America
3. As a public and meritocratic university, it has a 
significant degree of socioeconomic diversity among its students. The latter plus the fact that all 
graduates were exposed to a common academic treatment have fairly similar jobs produce an 
exceptionally interesting dataset to assess the effect of class on earnings.  
 
Chile constitutes also an interesting place to assess empirically the relationship between class 
and earnings. Since the Spanish conquest, Spanish and Amerindian descendants have mixed 
incessantly, and the size of afro-american population has historically been negligible. As a 
result, and except for the small current amerindian populations, “race” and “ethnicity” as such 
are not meaningful categories to identify and describe the vast majority of the mixed-blood 
chilean population, unlike other nations in the Americas.
4  Instead, we claim that class is a more 
appropriate characteristic to examine labor market discrimination in Chile.
5  It is well known 
that Chile has historically exhibited a particularly unequal income distribution even in 
comparison to other developing nations, being also a relatively class-segregated country.
6  Not 
surprisingly, as Chileans would agree, Chilean culture, language and everyday life is plagued 
with eloquent manifestations of class-consciousness. As we shall discuss in some detail, 
historians have claimed that this class-segregation can be traced back to various idiosyncratic 
developments of Chilean history, whose consequences may be still echoing today. In this 
                                                                 
2 However, see Kahn (1992), Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) and Biddle and Hamermesh (1998). 
3 University X is the only Chilean university included in a recent academic ranking of the top 500 
universities of the world elaborated in January, 2004. Only seven Latin American universities appear in 
this ranking. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/headlines/news/article_03_12_31_en.html. 
4 In the 2002 census less than 5 per cent of the population declared to belong to one of the existing 
Amerindian ethnic groups. 
5 Of course this does not imply that there is not an association between class and genotypes, as we shall 
discuss later.  
6 See for example Larrañaga (2002), Ruiz-Tagle (1999) and Contreras, Morone and Fortunato (2003). context, it is interesting to study whether contemporary Chilean society, having undergone 
profound market reforms since the 70s, shows signs of being a more meritocratic society.  
 
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 defines and discusses the notion of class employed 
in this paper. This section also describes the dataset and explains in detail the four measures of 
class used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the returns of class on earnings by means 
of earnings equations. Earnings predictions are obtained for various hypothetical combinations 
of class and academic p erformance, which sheds light on the relative importance of 
socioeconomic background and academic merit on the determination of earnings. Next, this 
section reports Oaxaca-Ramson earnings decomposition estimates and class earnings gaps. 
These are contrasted with earnings gaps reported in the literature for other workers’ 
characteristics, namely gender, race and physical appearance. Section 3 ends by discussing 
some plausible interpretations of the class earnings gaps. Finally, section 4 presents the main 




This article employs data from a follow-up survey conducted on a representative sample of 
students graduated from Business and Economics from University X in different years.
7 
University X is one of the largest universities in Chile, and it enrolls students from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds.  As mentioned earlier, the similar academic treatment received by 
the students combined with the wide disparity of their socioeconomic background produce a 
rich database to study the effects of class on earnings. The survey contains detailed information 
of each individual’s performance in the labor market, as well as job and employer 
characteristics. It also contains information about postgraduate studies followed by the 
individuals. This database has been merged with data containing detailed information about 
each individual’s socioeconomic background of origin. In addition, University X has provided 
detailed data about each individual’s academic performance throughout their undergraduate 
studies. A description of the variables in the merged dataset is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Class is certainly a complex concept. However, as Weber first noted, there is agreement that 
class involves a notion of economic status as well as other characteristics that provide social 
                                                                 
7 Business and Economics is a single 5 –year undergraduate program, which consists of 3 years of taught 
core courses in both disciplines, followed by 2 years in which students must choose either an Economics 
or Business specialization.  However, both specializations are fairly good substitutes for a wide variety of 
occupations in the labor market in Chile. status within a society.
8 In this paper we define “class” as an individual’s socioeconomic 
background, understood as a set of characteristics imprinted by his family and social 
environment of origin in the early phases of his life cycle. Therefore, our definition implies that 
class is a set of characteristics acquired early in life, which remain constant throughout time, 
and therefore cannot be modified during an individual’s life cycle. However, this notion does 
not contradict the possibility that individuals may modify their socioeconomic status throughout 
their life cycle, for example by investing in education.  Our notion of class has the important 
property of being exogenous from an econometric perspective. This implies that the causal 
relationship between class and earnings examined in this article is unambiguous; since the 
imprinting of class precedes the participation in the labor market, a statistical association 
between class and earnings must be i nterpreted as a causal effect of class (socioeconomic 
background) on earnings. 
 
In order to embrace different aspects of class, we employ four different measures of it. These 
are; i) family and environmental socioeconomic background, measured as the average income 
of the individual’s Municipality of origin; ii) the socioeconomic status of the individual’s 
school; iii) the individual’s ancestry, measured as the number of Basque or (non-Spanish) 
European surnames; and iv) an experimentally-generated subjective measure of the individuals’ 
socioeconomic status judged from their two surnames.
9 Each of these measures of class requires 
detailed explanation and justification, which are provided next in sequential order. 
 
i) As already mentioned, Chile has historically had one of the most unequal income distributions 
in the world, exhibiting also a high degree of statial class-segregation.
10 As a consequence, the 
average income of an individual’s Municipality contains a great deal of information about an 
individual’s l ikely family background, as well as about the socioeconomic background of his 
neighborhood and social environment of origin.
11  
 
ii) Chile’s school system is also highly segregated; while the majority of State schools enroll 
mostly lower-income students, private schools are attended mostly by well-off students. 
Therefore, school characteristics reveal information about each individual’s family background, 
as well as the socioeconomic background of the individual’ classmates and social environment. 
We employ the earliest available measure of each school’s socioeconomic background, which is 
                                                                 
8 This is well illustrated by the concepts of “new rich”, “old money vs. new money” and so on.  See for 
example Marshall (1994) for various operational definitions of “class”.  
9 Unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, in Spanish-speaking countries both the father and mother’s surnames are 
employed. 
10 See Larrañaga (2002) 
11 For example, the richest Municipality of the sample has an average income 11 times higher than the 
poorest Municipality of the sample. a five-point variable provided by the Ministry of Education for 1998. Since a great deal of time 
persistence can be expected for a school’s socioeconomic background, this measure is employed 
for all cohorts in the sample.
12 The five-point measure was transformed into a dummy variable 
equal to unity for schools of upper socioeconomic status.  In order to distinguish the possible 
effect on earnings of schools’ socioeconomic background from schools’ academic quality, we 
employ also comparable data of schools’ academic performance in the empirical estimation.
13  
 
iii) Apart from economic characteristics, there are reasons to hypothesize that class is also 
affectd by ancestry, particularly in Chile. Chilean historians have long emphasized how Chile’s 
socioeconomic elite has been formed largely from the descendants of the Basque and non-
Spanish European immigrants. In fact, the term “Castillian-Basque aristocracy” was coined by 
historians to represent the elite that arose from the merge of upper-class criollos (Spanish 
descendants living in Chilean territory) and the Basque immigrants who arrived in Chile mainly 
in the late colonial times.
14 Later, other flows of European immigration occurred during the XIX 
and part of the XX centuries. It has been well documented how these immigrants and its 
descendants merged with the existing Castillian-Basque aristocracy and overtook a significant 
fraction of Chile’s most productive land, developed different trades and industries, and engaged 
in the most prestigious professions. As a result, towards the turn of the XX century a significant 
fraction of national wealth and political and economic power was concentrated on a relatively 
small group of families and dynasties, a notion that is well captured by the well-known term “la 
Fronda Aristocrática”. These families were often connected by kinship relationships, and did 
not inbreed with the large mestizo (half-bred) population.
15 This situation is still recognizable 
today in Chilean society; it is estimated that only 25 per cent of the Chilean population descend 
mainly from Europeans, while 70 per cent are mestizos and 5 percent are predominantly of 
Amerindian ethnic background.
16 To capture the notion of ancestry we make use of the 
individuals’ father’s and mother’s surnames.  They were classified as being of Basque or non-
Spanish European origin, or otherwise (i.e. non-Basque Spanish) employing Chilean and 
                                                                 
12 In any case, this measure is highly correlated with schools Public/Private dependency. However, we 
employ the socioeconomic measure because it is more closely related to each individual’s socioeconomic 
background. 
13 This data correspond to the average scores in the SIMCE test administered by the Ministry of 
Education for 1998. Previous data is not available for all schools. However, since a lot of time persistence 
exist in a school’s academic performance as the evidence suggest, we employ this measure for all the 
cohorts in the sample.     
14 Mainly in the second half of the XVIII and the beginning of the XIX centuries. Hence Miguel de 
Unamuno’s famous remark that the two greatest creations of the Basques were the Society of Jesus and 
the Republic of Chile. Collier and Sater (1996), p.18.  
15 See for example Villalobos (1987)  and Collier and Sater (1996). 
16 See Collier, Skidmore and Blakemore, (1992).  international literature on the genealogical origins of surnames existing in Chile.
17  Accordingly, 
each individual obtained either none, one or two surnames of Basque or non-Spanish European 
origin. 
 
iv) Finally, the fourth measure of class was constructed by means of a novel experimental 
procedure; 30 university undergraduate students of various socioeconomic backgrounds were 
asked to provide anonymously and individually their perception of the graduates’ 
socioeconomic background judging only from their two surnames using a five-point scale.
18 The 
results f rom this experiment are remarkable and interesting in its own right; all 420 partial 
correlations of the ranking of the 30 evaluators were positive and statistically significant at 1 per 
cent confidence, ranging from 0.27 to 0.76 with an average of 0.53. Moreover, the variance of 
the 30 evaluations obtained by each of the 300 pairs of surnames evaluated was statistically 
lower than the variance that would be obtained if evaluators had assigned their ranks randomly. 
This lower-than-random variance achieved f or all evaluated individuals suggests that  all 
individuals obtained a significant degree of consensus regarding their socioeconomic 
background as perceived from their surnames.  
 
Table 1 presents the partial correlations among the four measures of class explained above. Both 
the Ancestry variable, defined as the number of Basque and Non-Spanish European surnames, 
and the Subjective Socioeconomic Status (SES) equal to each individual’s average ranking in 
the experiment were significantly correlated with each other. This suggests strongly that the 
evaluators indeed assessed the individuals’ likely socioeconomic background based on the 
ethnic origin suggested by their surnames. Moreover, these measures were also significantly 
correlated with the other two measures of class, namely the average income of the Municipality 
of origin and with School’s Socioeconomic Status (SES). These results suggest that 
socioeconomic background is in fact associated with ethnic background. In addition, these 
results suggest that in Chile surnames contain and reveal information about an individual’s 
perceived socioeconomic background of origin, and that this perception is amply shared and 
consensual. Finally, this agreed perception is actually correct, in the sense that the common 
perception is indeed associated with the individuals’ real socioeconomic background. 
 
                                                                 
17 Only non-Spanish European surnames were considered because it is impossible to disentangle Spanish 
surnames from recent Spanish immigrants from those of the large  mestizo population. Moreover, 
Amerindian surnames were not identified separately because they were very few.  The details and sources 
employed can be found in Núñez and Pérez (2003). 
18 The five categories of socioeconomic status were High, Upper-Middle, Middle, Lower-Middle and 
Lower  Socioeconomic Status.  Subjects were paid $ 1.000 for turning-up and for doing  the experiment, 
plus a prize ranging from $15.000 to $5.000 for the top three evaluators whose guesses coincided the The high and statistically significant correlations among the four measures of class shown in 
Table 1 pose a potential collinearity problem, which may undermine the statistical significance 
of each class measure in the empirical estimation. If, however, these measures of class turn out 
to be jointly significant in causing earnings despite their positive correlation, then their 
coefficient should be taken as fairly robust. 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix of Class Measures 
 
  School SES  Ancestry  Subjective SES 
Municipality SES  0.39  0.28  0.34 
School SES    0.24  0.37 
Ancestry      0.58 
All correlation coefficients are significant at 1 per cent confidence. 
 
 
III. The returns to class 
 
The graduates’ earnings  were collected as ordered data by the follow-up survey. Respondents 
were asked to report their earnings using a scale of nine money intervals. In order to obtain 
money measures of earnings for each individual, we employed two alternative procedures. The 
first was to compute the median value of each interval, and the second was to compute the mean 




Table 2 shows the results of mean-difference tests for the kernel-based earnings of upper vs. 
lower SES groups, according to each of the four class variables described above. In all cases 
upper-class individuals have, on average, statistically higher earnings. Table 3 shows the results 
of v arious specifications of earnings equations. Each model in Table 3 includes three different 
measures of earnings as dependent variables. The first column of each model is an ordered 
probit regression employing the ordered earnings data. The dependent variable of the second 
and third columns of each model are the log of the median value of each earnings interval and 
the log of the mean value of each earnings interval derived from the kernel-based procedure. As 
in the rest of the article, all regressions have robust standard errors. Table 3 indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
highest number of times with the most voted rank for each individual across the 30 evaluators. The details 
of the experiment can be found in Núñez, and Pérez (2003). 
19 From the optimal kernel density function f(x), we computed the term f(x)/x for all earnings intervals, 
and then imputed this value for all the observations of the corresponding interval.  results are very similar regardless of the dependent (earnings) variable and the econometric 
specification employed. All specifications yield the standard results of an earnings equation, 
namely concave e xperience, and relative earnings premium for males. The coefficients of 
various measures of academic performance at university are positive, significant and robust 
across the different specifications, namely the academic performance percentile, performance in 
final exams and whether the student had interrupted or failed in a previous university degree 
(homolog).
20 Schooling in years is not included as a regressor because all observations in the 
sample are university graduates, yielding very little variance in this variable. However, dummy 
variables for post-graduate studies yielded positive coefficients, although not statistically 
significant. This may be possibly due to the inclusion of the various measures of ability 
described above, which is consistent with the possibility that post-graduate studies may have an 
important signaling component. Employees in private firms earn more than their counterparts 
(mainly in universities and in the public sector), and Economics and Business majors have 
similar earnings. The reduced regressions in Models 3 and 4 include only the variables 
significant at 10 per cent confidence. These variables explain nearly half of the variance in 
earnings, more than most of the standard earnings equations in the literature. This may be due to 
the inclusion of regressors not commonly employed in other earnings studies, namely measures 
of academic performance and class.  
 
All four measures of class are highly and jointly significant and robust across all specifications 
despite the existence of collinearity among them, with the exception of Ancestry and Subjective 
SES, which have the highest correlation (0.58). However, they become significant when 
included separately from each other but keeping the other class variables, as in Models 3 and 4 
of Table 3. Taken at face value, the evidence of Table 3 indicates that there exists an important 
and statistically significant return to employees’ socioeconomic background. It is important to 
note that the measures of class are significant and robust even when other possibly class-related 
measures of productivity are included, such as school’s academic performance, school size (as 
measures of networking opportunities),  English proficiency, postgraduate studies, “leadership” 
(measured as participation in student unions and/or competitive sports as undergraduates), and 
geographical origin.
21 This suggests that the return to class may be the result of some form of 
discrimination and/or some class-related source of productivity unrelated to those included in 
the models in Table 3.   
                                                                 
20 The score in the PAA, a multiple-choice test required to apply to a University degree in Chile was not 
included for two reasons. First, this score is not designed to be strictly comparable across cohorts. 
Second, PAA scores measure an individual’s relative performance in a given year. This raises yet another 
comparability problem as the coverage of the PAA has increased significantly in the last decades.  
21 A large proportion of jobs in Business and Economics are located in Santiago. Employees born and 
raised in Santiago may have more connections and networking opportunities than outsiders.  
Note that all models included in Table 3 assume that the effect of academic performance on 
earnings is the same regardless of the individuals’ socio-economic background. However, there  
is a reason to expect academic performance to be relatively more important in determining 
earnings for graduates from poorer backgrounds: while better-off students may compensate a 
poor academic performance with social skills and connections, students from poorer 
backgrounds are less likely to do so. Accordingly, academic achievement seems a relatively 
more important means to succeed in the labor market for poorer students. We investigate this 
hypothesis in the models presented in Table 4, where academic performance at university has 
been interacted  with the various measures of class. This procedure poses an econometric 
problem, however: the variables that employ the class measures either in isolation or interacted 
with academic performance are collinear, which reduce their statistical significance. To avoid 
this problem, we have estimated only those models where a specific class measure is employed 
either in isolation or interacted with academic performance, as shown in Table 4.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The models in Table 4 share interesting features. First, all the variables have very similar 
coefficients and statistical significance across the models. Second, all the models indicate joint 
existence of intercept class effects and interactions between class and academic performance. In 
particular, all  models suggest an increased return to academic performance for students from 
lower socio-economic status, which confirms the hypothesis mentioned above.   
 
The results of Table 4 allow studying the relative importance of class vs. academic performance 
in d etermining earnings. In order to do so, we computed earnings predictions from various 
hypothetical combinations of class and academic performance, which are reported in Table 5. 
The model used to obtain these predictions was selected from those in Table 4 by employing 
Davidson and Mackinnon´s J-test, designed to choose among nonnested models. Each model in 
Table 4 was tested against all the remaining models.
22 This procedure indicated that the Models 
1 and 5 could not be defeated by any of the remaining models, while they could not defeat each 
other. Model 5 was finally selected due to its slighter better goodness-of-fit. 
 
Table 5 presents the predicted income in chilean pesos of 2000 for various combinations of 
class and academic performance derived from Model 5 in Table 4, keeping the remaining 
variables of the model fixed at their sample means. Table 5 provides several interesting results. 
First, the earnings estimates show that a bottom-of-the-class student raised in a rich 
Municipality and a rich school,  and endowed with upper-class ancestry is expected to earn statistically more than a top-of-class student raised in a poor Municipality, without upper-class 
ancestry and coming from an average State school. Various cells of Table 5 even suggest that 
the bottom-of-the-class hypothetical employee raised in a privileged environment is likely to 
earn statistically more than an ample variety of top-of-class students raised in  average 
socioeconomic backgrounds. This exercise provides clear suggestions that socioeconomic 
origins seem relatively more important than academic performance in determining earnings in 
the labor market. Accordingly, this evidence portrays the Chilean professional labor market as 
being far from a meritocratic one.  
 
However, Table 5 does indicate that academic performance is indeed rewarded in the labor 
market, although in varying degrees depending on the students’ socioeconomic background. As 
hypothesized and demonstrated earlier, a marginal increase in academic performance raises a 
poor student’s expected income more than that of an upper-class student. In fact, Table 5 shows 
that academic merit is fairly irrelevant in determining an upper class student’s expected income, 
judging from the first column of the upper panel. The enhanced responsiveness of a poor 
students’ expected income to his or her academic performance suggests that academic merit or 
effort is indeed a means that socially-handicapped students can employ to improve their 
prospects in the labor market. However, our earlier conclusion indicates that academic merit is 
unlikely to fully close the earnings gap relative to an upper-class student, regardless even of the 
latter’s academic performance.  
 
The predictions of Table 5 also provide an order of magnitude of the earnings gap between 
employees of upper vs. lower socioeconomic background, keeping academic merit fixed. For 
example an average student (in the 50
th academic percentile) from an upper-class background is 
likely to earn nearly 50 per cent more than an average student from the poorest socioeconomic 
background in the sample.
23 This rough figure does stand out as a large gap even in comparison 
with the earnings gap reported for other workers characteristics. Next, we estimate more 
appropriate class earnings gaps following one of the standard methodologies employed in the 
literature for these purposes.  Tables 6a and 6b show the Oaxaca-Ramson (1994) decomposition 
of class-earnings effects for the four measures of class, with Ancestry and Subjective SES 
included separately as in models 3 and 4 of Table 2.
24 Each row of Tables 6a and 6b 
decomposes the earnings gap associated with the corresponding class measure into a premium 
and a penalty for upper and lower SES employees, respectively, in addition to the part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
22 See Greene (2000) for a detailed explanation of Davidson and MacKinnon’s J test. 
23  This figure is obtained using the expected earnings figures of 1828724 and 1203572 chilean pesos 
reported in Table 5. 
24 The derivation and interpretation of the Oaxaca-Ramson decomposition is fairly standard and it is not 
presented here. For a presentation and discussion, see the original paper in Oaxaca and Ramson (1994). earnings gap explained by differences in skills between the two class groups. Tables 6a and 6b 
indicate that School, Municipality, Ancestry and Subjective SES all have statistically significant 
earnings premium for upper SES employees, as well as earnings penalties for lower SES 
employees, controlling for differences in observable skills. In all three cases, the order of 
magnitude of the earnings premium and penalties is in the range of 4 to 7 per cent. Accordingly, 
each of the class measures yields earnings gaps unrelated to skills differences of around 10 per 
cent, which correspond to the sum of the premium and the penalty for each class measure. 
 
Note that Tables 6a and 6b report the decompositions for each class measures separately, that is, 
keeping the remaining class measures fixed at the sample mean values. Therefore, the sum of 
the premia and penalties of all three measures of class provides a measure of the total earnings 
gap associated with socio-economic background, once skills differences between the upper and 
lower class groups have been considered. The combined effects of the three measures of class in 
Tables 6ª and 6b yield class earnings gaps of 30 to 35 per cent between upper SES and lower 
SES employees, all other observable characteristics kept constant.  
 
The class earnings gaps reported in Tables 6a and 6b seem remarkably large in comparison to 
the earnings gaps reported in the literature for other workers’ characteristics. For example, the 
earnings gaps between African Americans and Whites in the US reported in the literature are 
typically situated in the 5 to 15 per cent range, after controlling for skills differences.
25 On the 
other hand, gender earnings gaps unexplained by differences in observed skills are in the range 
of 20 to 25 per cent.
26 Comparable gender earnings gaps in Chile are close to 20 per cent.
27 
Finally, estimates of the beauty earnings gap amount to 12–13 percent.
28  
 
The large class earnings gaps reported above can be interpreted as evidence of class 
discrimination exercised by employers under the assumption that all relevant skills and sources 
of productivity have indeed been included in the model. It is certainly impossible to actually 
observe all possible sources of productivity. However, our database does include various 
measures of productivity, many of which are uncommon in earnings differential studies, such as 
academic performance at university, school’s academic quality, second language (English) 
proficiency, and post graduate studies.
29 This suggests that interpreting the large class earnings 
gap reported here as resulting at least partly from employer discrimination seems plausible and 
even likely. This hypothesis, however, remains an interesting topic for future research.  
                                                                 
25 See, for example, the evidence reviewed in Borjas (2000). 
26 See for example, Altonji and Blank (1999), and Borjas (2000).   
27 Contreras and Puentes (2001). 
28 Hammermesh and Biddle (1994). 
29 However, note that only the former turned out to be statistically signifficant.  
V.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has shown that class, understood as an individual’s socioeconomic background of 
origin, can be an important factor in the determination of earnings in the labor market. A large  
return to class emerged simultaneously in several measures of class, despite some degree of 
collinearity among them. These effects were highly statistically significant and robust 
throughout different specifications. The order of magnitude of the class earnings gap is nearly 
twice as large as than the gender earnings gaps, and about three times as large as the earnings 
gaps for race and beauty reported in the literature. The effect of class on earnings is more 
important than academic performance, which suggests a modest degree of meritocracy in the 
labor market for professionals in Chile.  
 
Studying the causes of the large returns to class remains a topic for future research. In particular, 
future investigations must try to establish the extent to which the return to class is explained by 
some form of discrimination in the labor market, or by other sources of labor productivity not 
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Table 2. Labor Market Earnings of Higher vs. Lower SES 
Professionals 
(Chilean Pesos of 2000) 
         
Measures of SES  High SES  Low SES  Difference  t-test 
School  1,625,091  1,355,342  269,749  2.69
a 
Municipality  1,725,734  1,281,667  444,067  4.72
a 
Ancestry  1,667,980  1,449,967  218,013  2.23
b 
Subjective SES  1,787,577  1,434,531  353,046  3.29
a 
* a, b indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 per cent, respectively.  
  Table 3. Earnings Equations         
                         
      Model 1        Model 2        Model 3        Model 4    




























  (0.0026)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0021)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0022)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0021)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 













  (0.16)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Capital District=1  -0.22  -0.10  -0.08                   
  (0.30)  (0.13)  (0.12)                   
Received Funding =1  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03                   
  (0.18)  (0.064)  (0.062)                   













  (0.22)  (0.076)  (0.075)  (0.19)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.19)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.18)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Academic Percentile  -0.50











  (0.24)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.21)  (0.075)  (0.073)  (0.21)  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.21)  (0.076)  (0.074) 













  (0.21)  (0.073)  (0.070)  (0.19)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.19)  (0.068)  (0.065)  (0.19)  (0.067)  (0.064) 
Leadership  0.05  0.05  0.06                   
  (0.31)  (0.11)  (0.10)                   
Business in business job with MBA degree  0.44  0.15  0.16                   
  (0.39)  (0.13)  (0.13)                   
Top mark in finals=1  -0.21  -0.07  -0.07                   
  (0.27)  (0.085)  (0.083)                   
English Proficiency =1  -0.19  -0.06  -0.06                   
  (0.24)  (0.081)  (0.080)                   
Postgraduate studies  0.04 
0.0004 
 
  -0.01                   
  (0.20)  (0.069)  (0.067)                   










  (0.30)  (0.104)  (0.101)  (0.15)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.15)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.15)  (0.052)  (0.051) 
School Size*High SES School  0.002  0.001  0.001                   
  (0.0023)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)                   
School's Score  0.005  0.002  0.002                   
  (0.0035)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)                   













  (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) 
Basque/Non-Spanish European 
Ancestry  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.13  0.06  0.05  0.21
b  0.08
b  0.08
b       
  (0.13)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.11)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.090)  (0.032)  (0.031)       
Subjective SES  0.26




  (0.15)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.12)  (0.044)  (0.043)        (0.10)  (0.036)  (0.036) 













  (0.24)  (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.15)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.15)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.15)  (0.052)  (0.050) 
Public firm=1  0.39  0.12  0.11                   
  (0.26)  (0.089)  (0.085)                   
Self-employed  -0.27  -0.11  -0.11                   
  (0.48)  (0.16)  (0.16)                   
Self-employed *Received Funding  -1.13  -0.33  -0.31                   
  (1.07)  (0.37)  (0.35)                   
Firm size  -0.12  -0.03  -0.03                   
  (0.10)  (0.036)  (0.035)                   
Economist in economics job  0.016  -0.003  0.001                   
  (0.32)  (0.11)  (0.11)                   
Economist in business job  -0.21  -0.06  -0.05                   
  (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.11)                   
Business in business job  0.078  0.017  0.023                   
  (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.10)                   
Constant    12.10
a  12.15
a    12.45
a  12.51
a    12.61
a  12.65
a    12.38
a  12.43
a 
    (0.40)  (0.38)    (0.17)  (0.17)    (0.13)  (0.12)    (0.17)  (0.16) 
R^2     0.55  0.55     0.51  0.51     0.51  0.51     0.51  0.51 
Pseudo R^2  0.21      0.19      0.19      0.19     
Observations  246  246  246  283  283  283  283  283  283  283  283  283 
* With a, b, c significant to 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviation in parenthesis. Table 4. Earnings Equations with Class-Academic Performance Interactions 
 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Experience  0.167a  0.170a  0.169a  0.168a  0.168a  0.169a  0.169a  0.169a 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Experience^2  -0.0056a  -0.0057a  -0.0056a  -0.0056a  -0.0056a  -0.0056a  -0.0056a  -0.0056a 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Gender (Male=1)  0.261a  0.270a  0.267a  0.263a  0.266a  0.267a  0.266a  0.269a 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Previous studies=1  -0.169b  -0.180a  -0.173a  -0.171b  -0.171b  -0.180a  -0.179a  -0.178a 
  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Passed Finals 1st attempt  0.149a  0.162a  0.160a  0.156a  0.156a  0.160a  0.155a  0.158a 
  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Academic Percentile  -0.130c  -1.020a  -0.914a  -0.770a  -0.357a  -0.872a  -0.297a  -0.471a 
  (0.078)  (0.208)  (0.216)  (0.223)  (0.106)  (0.218)  (0.096)  (0.108) 
Private Firm =1  0.137a  0.128a  0.129a  0.130a  0.133a  0.126a  0.128a  0.129a 
  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
High SES School = 1  0.121b    0.123b  0.122b  0.116b       
  (0.052)    (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.052)       
Municipality Average Income  0.0006a      0.0006b    0.0006b  0.0006b   
  (0.0002)      (0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002)   
Subjective SES  0.082b        0.080b    0.084b  0.086b 
  (0.037)        (0.037)    (0.036)  (0.036) 
High SES School *Ac. Percentile    0.232a        0.247a  0.268a  0.242a 
    (0.090)        (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.089) 
Municip. Avg. Income*Ac. Percentile  0.0009b  0.0011b    0.0012a      0.0010b 
    (0.0004)  (0.0004)    (0.0004)      (0.0004) 
Subjective SES* Ac. Percentile    0.167b  0.172a  0.188a    0.173a     
    (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.064)    (0.064)     
Constant   12.427a  12.888a  12.816a  12.717a  12.546a  12.788a  12.498a  12.593a 
  (0.159)  (0.106)  (0.112)  (0.119)  (0.160)  (0.116)  (0.161)  (0.161) 
R^2  0.507  0.517  0.515  0.514  0.511  0.512  0.515  0.515 
Adjusted R^2  0.489  0.499  0.497  0.496  0.493  0.500  0.497  0.498 
Observations  283  283  283  283  283  283  283  283  
               
Table 5. Predicted income conditional upon class and academic performance 
(Chilean Pesos of 2000) 
               
Distinctive Municipality      Highest Income Municipality (Vitacura) 
School SES      High SES    Low SES 
Subjective SES       High  Low    High  Low 
  1,838,060  1,572,587    1,643,241  1,377,767  10 % (top) 
  (82,433)  (96,243)    (109,684)  (95,891) 
  1,828,724  1,563,251    1,633,905  1,368,432  50 % 
  (70,579)  (87,191)    (112,059)  (99,373) 





   (112,742)  (124,484)     (151,012)  (142,433) 
               
Distinctive Municipality      Average Income Municipality (Ñuñoa) 
School SES      High SES    Low SES 
Subjective SES       High  Low    High  Low 
  1,823,867  1,558,393    1,629,048  1,363,574  10 % (top) 
  (84,235)  (96,100)    (109,348)  (93,775) 
  1,764,855  1,499,382    1,570,036  1,304,562  50 % 
  (66,909)  (74,982)    (101,834)  (78,820) 




90 %  
   (90,092)  (90,511)     (122,963)  (99,461) 
               
Distinctive Municipality      Lowest Income Municipality (La Pintana) 
School SES      High SES    Low SES 
Subjective SES       High  Low    High  Low 
  1,801,424  1,535,951    1,606,605  1,341,132  10 % (top) 
  (88,355)  (97,098)    (109,894)  (91,625) 
  1,663,864  1,398,391    1,469,045  1,203,572  50% 
  (91,986)  (85,289)    (108,139)  (72,137) 




90 %  
   (130,330)  (113,036)     (138,211)  (97,930) 
* Standard errors in parenthesis. 
  
Table 6a. Oaxaca-Ramsom Earnings Decomposition:  
Class Premium, Class Penalties and Skills Differences 
                    
95% Confidence 








Bootstrap  Min  Max 
   Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.041  0.05  0.023  0.003  0.096 
School  Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.075  0.044  0.02  0.005  0.083 
  Premium + Penalty (1)  0.116         
   Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.068  0.092  0.043  0.006  0.177 
  Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.057  0.055  0.018  0.02  0.09 
Municipality  Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.071  0.068  0.023  0.023  0.113 
  Premium + Penalty (2)  0.128         
   Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.199  0.203  0.049  0.106  0.3 
Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.053  0.05  0.023  0.003  0.096 
Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.046  0.044  0.02  0.005  0.083 




Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.089  0.092  0.043  0.006  0.177 
Total Class Earnings Gap (1+2+3)  0.343         





Table 6b. Oaxaca-Ramsom Earnings Decomposition:  
Class Premium, Class Penalties and Skills Differences 
                    
95% Confidence 








Bootstrap  Min  Max 
   Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.036  0.036  0.014  0.008  0.064 
School  Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.066  0.065  0.025  0.015  0.115 
  Premium + Penalty (1)  0.102         
   Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.084  0.089  0.048  -0.007  0.185 
  Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.050  0.049  0.018  0.012  0.085 
Municipality  Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.062  0.059  0.023  0.013  0.106 
  Premium + Penalty (2)  0.112         
   Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.214  0.215  0.047  0.121  0.309 
Premium: XH(BH-BP)  0.066  0.065  0.032  0.000  0.129 
Penalty: XL(BP-BL)  0.024  0.024  0.012  0.000  0.048 




Skills Differences: (XH-XL)BP  0.130  0.132  0.048  0.036  0.228 
Total Class Earnings Gap (1+2+3)  0.304         





Table 7. Description of Variables 
           
Variable  Observations Average  S.D.  Min  Max 
Income by category  293  4.392491  2.127658  1  10 
Experience  315  7.766667  3.661688  0.5  25.5 
Experience^2  315  73.68651  66.72715  0.25  650.25 
Schooling  322  17.49689  0.9145703  17  21 
Gender (Male=1)  322  0.6614907  0.4739392  0  1 
Capital District=1  317  0.9337539  0.2491049  0  1 
Municipality Average Income  315  198.4052  104.397  43.622  410.505 
Private School = 1  322  0.6925466  0.462157  0  1 
High SES School=1  316  0.6550633  0.4761016  0  1 
School Size  283  182.7456  177.2286  16  643 
School's Score  283  307.0336  24.99776  219.5  344 
Received Funding =1  316  0.3924051  0.4890606  0  1 
ramos Homologados  316  0.1329114  0.3400174  0  1 
English Proficiency =1  316  0.1455696  0.3532336  0  1 
Leadership  316  0.0664557  0.249472  0  1 
Academic Percentile  319  0.5222026  0.2942802  0.0153846  1 
Economics degree =1  322  0.4099379  0.4925874  0  1 
Passed finals 1st Attempt  322  0.7919255  0.4065622  0  1 
Graduated=1  316  0.9810127  0.1366966  0  1 
Top mark in finals=1  322  0.0621118  0.2417342  0  1 
Postgraduate studies  319  0.2915361  0.4551838  0  1 
Economist in economics job  304  0.2138158  0.4106743  0  1 
Economist in business job  304  0.2006579  0.4011529  0  1 
Business in business job  304  0.5427632  0.4989893  0  1 
Business in economics job  304  0.0394737  0.1950401  0  1 
Local MBA degree=1  322  0.0652174  0.2472934  0  1 
International MBA degree=1  322  0.0124224  0.1109336  0  1 
PhD degree = 1  322  0.0186335  0.1354374  0  1 
Mining=1  295  0.0101695  0.1005003  0  1 
Manufacture =1  295  0.0983051  0.2982326  0  1 
Construction=1  295  0.0338983  0.1812749  0  1 
Commerce=1  295  0.1288136  0.3355627  0  1 
Government Services=1  295  0.1355932  0.3429378  0  1 
Financial services=1  295  0.3118644  0.464042  0  1 
Personal services  295  0.0372881  0.1897889  0  1 
Natural resources=1  322  0.0248447  0.155894  0  1 
Private firm=1  322  0.6055901  0.4894842  0  1 
Public firm=1  321  0.0778816  0.2684036  0  1 
Civil servant  321  0.0996885  0.3000519  0  1 
Education sector=1  321  0.0373832  0.1899951  0  1 
Consultant  321  0.0311526  0.1740014  0  1 
NGO  321  0.0186916  0.1356449  0  1 
Self-employed  321  0.05919  0.2363485  0  1 
Unemployed  321  0.0685358  0.2530576  0  1 
Firm size  297  3.306397  0.9499606  1  4 
Amerindian   322  0.015528  0.1238324  0  1 
Basque  322  0.1583851  0.3903922  0  2 
Asian  322  0.0186335  0.1567604  0  2 
Middle east  322  0.0186335  0.1924445  0  2 
Non-Spanish European  322  0.4037267  0.6203093  0  2 
Jewish  322  0.1645963  0.4745104  0  2 
Non-Basque Spanish  322  1.242236  0.7552631  0  2 
Subjective SES  289  3.45917  0.6556861  2.2  4.9 Appendix 1: Correlation Matrix (n = 246) 
  
  





















Experience  1                         
Experience^2  0.9372  1                       
Gender (Male=1)  0.153  0.1539  1                     
Capital District=1  -0.033  -0.0291  -0.0066  1                   
Received Funding =1  -0.0669  -0.0687  0.0898  0.0287  1                 
dramos homologados  0.19  0.1891  0.0506  0.0495  -0.1058  1               
Academic Percentile  0.0614  0.0415  0.0967  0.0641  0.137  0.0264  1             
Passed finals 1st Attempt  0.0003  0.0115  -0.038  -0.0012  -0.1084  0.0023  -0.2284  1           
Leadership  -0.0685  -0.0534  0.0048  -0.015  0.0779  -0.0543  -0.2035  0.0882  1         
Top mark in finals=1  -0.1155  -0.101  -0.0404  -0.011  -0.0688  -0.0499  -0.1766  0.1254  0.0465  1       
English Proficiency =1  -0.1135  -0.1005  -0.1945  -0.1072  -0.2132  0.041  -0.1976  0.0241  0.0726  0.2219  1     
Postgraduate studies  0.0051  -0.0187  0.0174  0.0686  0.0259  0.0385  -0.0487  0.1115  0.2275  0.0686  0.0315  1   
High SES School=1  0.0333  0.03  -0.0607  -0.0846  -0.519  0.0385  0.0017  -0.0453  -0.0049  -0.0161  0.1714  -0.1379  1 
School Size*High SES School  0.1105  0.0911  0.0543  -0.1175  -0.435  0.0064  0.0477  -0.087  0.0565  0.0156  0.2226  -0.0698  0.8307 
School's Score  0.0085  0.0064  -0.0344  -0.2236  -0.1911  -0.0189  -0.0189  -0.0132  0.1165  0.0331  0.1406  -0.0434  0.2896 
Municipality Average Income  0.0347  0.0346  0.0065  -0.3309  -0.3788  0.0068  -0.0682  -0.0563  -0.023  -0.0562  0.1369  -0.0618  0.3927 
Basque/Non-Spanish European Ancestry  -0.0115  -0.0418  -0.0381  -0.0247  -0.1993  -0.075  -0.0515  -0.0526  0.0731  -0.0473  0.1249  0.0462  0.2387 
Subjective SES  0.0535  0.0339  -0.0174  -0.0161  -0.3427  0.0112  -0.1711  0.0307  -0.0172  -0.1011  0.1235  -0.121  0.367 
Private firm=1  0.0307  -0.0223  0.0536  0.0295  -0.2324  0.027  0.0607  -0.0643  -0.1241  -0.0717  0.0603  -0.2391  0.2255 
Public firm=1  0.0054  0.0074  -0.0521  0.0184  0.2208  0.0073  0.0757  0.007  0.1707  -0.0356  -0.0892  0.1763  -0.2689 
Self-employed  0.2144  0.2423  0.061  -0.0742  -0.1663  -0.0499  -0.0959  0.0832  -0.0766  -0.0742  -0.0602  -0.1068  0.1207 
Self-employed *Received Funding   0.1066  0.1014  0.0652  -0.0247  0.1067  -0.0331  -0.0584  -0.0775  -0.0254  -0.0247  -0.0356  -0.0588  -0.0338 
Firm size  -0.2488  -0.2571  -0.0365  0.0092  0.0255  -0.0976  0.0799  0.0431  0.0201  0.0261  -0.0202  0.0523  -0.0304 
Economist in economics job  -0.1931  -0.1506  0.0157  -0.0155  0.0512  -0.0876  -0.0166  0.0687  0.2116  0.0648  0.0127  0.2553  -0.0666 
Economist in business job  0.2382  0.2017  0.0868  -0.058  -0.0191  0.0033  0.016  -0.1133  -0.1031  -0.058  0.068  0.0699  -0.0591 
Business in business job  -0.0584  -0.0589  -0.1188  0.0796  -0.0462  0.044  0.0023  0.0673  -0.066  -0.0173  -0.0604  -0.2502  0.1203 



































School Size*High SES School  1                           
School's Score  0.3241  1                         
Municipality Average Income  0.3659  0.2014  1                       
Basque/Non-Spanish European Ancestry  0.2262  0.2254  0.275  1                     
Subjective SES  0.2608  0.1276  0.343  0.5782  1                   
Private firm=1  0.2152  0.118  0.2298  0.114  0.1622  1                 
Public firm=1  -0.2187  -0.1615  -0.1544  -0.1208  -0.1225  -0.4525  1               
Self-employed  0.1208  0.0558  0.1025  -0.0473  0.1029  -0.2402  -0.0896  1             
Self-employed *Received Funding   0.0019  0.033  0.0266  -0.012  -0.0154  -0.1246  -0.0298  0.3323  1           
Firm size  -0.016  -0.0123  0.0159  0.0554  -0.0159  0.2198  0.1347  -0.4658  -0.1745  1         
Economist in economics job  -0.0702  0.0787  -0.11  0.042  -0.0519  -0.3653  0.1104  -0.0556  -0.0452  0.0244  1       
Economist in business job  -0.0008  -0.0286  0.0123  0.0617  0.0317  0.0059  0.1063  0.0217  0.0668  -0.1075  -0.2519  1     
Business in business job  0.0686  -0.0432  0.0901  -0.0567  0.0318  0.2701  -0.1508  0.0473  -0.0111  0.1186  -0.5638  -0.5709  1   